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coaching experience: examining its role in 
coaches’ decision making
ineke Vergeer1 and John lyle2
1 Durham University, England
2 University of Queensland, Australia
There is an emerging body of opinion to suggest that sports coaching is a complex, 
“messy” process, with often irreconcilable goals (Bowes & Jones, 2006; Cushion, Ar-
mour, & Jones, 2003; Jones & Wallace, 2005), resulting in a constant series of dilemmas 
and decision making. Abraham, Collins, and Martindale (2006) even concluded that, 
fundamentally, “coaching is a decision-making process” (p. 549). 
Despite the increasing acknowledgement of the cognitive and decision-making na-
ture of sports coaching, empirical research into coaches’ decision making is still extreme-
ly limited (Gilbert & Trudel, 2004). In contrast, other professional domains and academic 
disciplines (e.g., medicine, law, teaching, economics) have enriched the literature on de-
cision making with both descriptive and prescriptive accounts, as well as a wide range 
of theories, models, and methodologies (e.g., Hastie, 2001; Patel, Kaufman, & Arocha, 
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2002; Pennington & Hastie, 1992; Shavelson & Stern, 1981; Wiggins & O’Hare, 1995; 
Zsambok & Klein, 1997). 
A commonly used approach in the study of decision making in professional do-
mains is the expert-novice paradigm, which focuses on a comparison of processes and 
procedures employed by decision makers with different levels of expertise (Galanter & 
Patel, 2005; Ste. Marie, 2003; Westerman, 1991). This paradigm has been employed 
in a small number of studies on coaches’ cognitions (e.g., Jones, Housner, & Kornspan, 
1995, 1997). In a recent article, Abraham et al. (2006) focused specifically on decision-
making characteristics of expert coaches. Combining their findings with those from the 
general literature on the cognitive aspects of expertise suggests that, compared to in-
dividuals with little experience in a given domain, those with considerable experience 
are better able to (a) define a problem and weigh the options (Hershey, Walsh, Read, & 
Chulef, 1990; Klein, 1998), (b) tune into the most relevant information (Araújo, Davids, 
& Serpa, 2005; Jones et al., 1995; Lyle, 1999), (c) perceive problems as integrated 
wholes, as they can link them better to already stored mental scripts or schemas derived 
from personal experience (Galanter & Patel, 2005; Klein, 1998; Wiggins & O’Hare, 
1995), (d) act more prospectively due to their reliance on meaningful information in 
the wider context (Araújo et al., 2005), (e) embed their decisions in a hierarchical plan 
of process, outcome, long-, medium-, and short-term goals (Abraham et al., 2006), (f) 
break complex situations down into meaningful chunks (Abraham et al., 2006; Galanter 
& Patel, 2005), (g) integrate knowledge from different (and sometimes contradictory) 
sources (Abraham et al., 2006), and (h) consider the consequences of a decision and 
realize that decisions can only be ‘best fit’ (Abraham et al., 2006). 
In contrast, (relative) novices in a given domain have limited experiential knowl-
edge to rely on (Galanter & Patel, 2005) and lack the relevant knowledge to tune into 
the most relevant sources of information; therefore, they rely more on the exploration 
of the immediate situation (Araújo et al., 2005) and on surface information (Galanter 
& Patel, 2005; Wiggins & O’Hare, 1995). Extrapolating from Abraham et al.’s (2006) 
findings on expert coaches, it may be expected that less experienced coaches will (a) 
set goals more haphazardly, in a less structured and hierarchical fashion; consequently, 
their problem space in which to reason about and weigh decision alternatives will be 
less structured, (b) not be able to integrate as much information from different sources, 
either because they do not have (as much) access to those sources, or because they are 
unable to integrate it logically, creatively, or productively, and (c) have limited overview 
of the consequences of their decisions. 
In view of the dearth of empirical research on coaches’ decision making, especially 
from the novice-expert paradigm perspective, we decided to re-analyze the data of a 
coaches’ decision-making study collected by the first author as part of her PhD research 
(Vergeer, 1994). The study entailed a mixed methods design (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 
2003; Vergeer & Lyle, 2007), asking coaches to respond to hypothetical scenarios 
about an injured gymnast’s participation in competition by providing both numerical 
likelihood scores (on a scale from 0-10) and reasons for their decision. The data were 
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analyzed quantitatively via a Conjoint Analysis procedure (Louvière, 1988) to determine 
the coaches’ numerical “decision policies” (Vergeer & Hogg, 1999), and qualitatively 
via a Thematic Analysis (Smith, 1995). The qualitative data were also quantified (Tashak-
kori & Teddlie, 1998; Vergeer & Lyle, 2007) to allow frequency counts and comparisons 
of coaches’ considerations and arguments across sub-groups. In the original analysis 
(Vergeer, 1994), comparison across coaches was conducted on the basis of (a) clusters 
emerging within the numerical decision policies, and (b) competitive level. The latter 
suggested that coaches working with national/international (elite) level athletes tended 
to be more cautious in their decisions about injured athletes, had less complex deci-
sion policies, used different managing strategies, and considered more alternatives to 
competing than coaches working with athletes at lower (intermediate and basic) levels 
(Vergeer, 2005). The level of experience of the coaches, however, varied across the 
competitive levels. Although on average, coaches at the elite level had significantly more 
years of coaching experience (13.7) than the coaches at intermediate (8.5) and basic 
(7.7) levels, there was quite a range of coaching experience even within the lower levels, 
and some coaches who were working with non-elite level gymnasts at the time of the 
study had coached elite-level gymnasts in the past. Hence, dividing the coaches accord-
ing to competitive level gave some insight into the role of contextual factors impacting 
upon coaches’ decisions, but provided a somewhat skewed perspective on the effect 
of coaching experience upon coaches’ decision making about this type of problem. In 
order to create a clearer picture of the role of experience in coaches’ decision making, 
we decided to re-analyze the data by sub-dividing the coaches according to experi-
ence—operationalized as the number of years spent in coaching. 
Our purpose in doing so was to examine the possible differences between less and 
more experienced coaches in their numerical decision policies on the one hand, and 
in the arguments used to justify the decisions on the other. In accordance with the pol-
icy-capturing approach to judgment and decision making (Brehmer & Brehmer, 1988; 
Doherty & Brehmer, 1997; Louvière, 1988), the numerical decision policies represented 
the coaches’ weighing of a number of situational parameters in the form of a regres-
sion model, with the regression weights indicating the importance of each parameter or 
combination of parameters (i.e., main and interaction effects) in relation to the decision 
choice (in this case the likelihood of competing). Decision policies can vary in both com-
prehensiveness (i.e., the number of significant regression weights indicating how many 
parameters are weighed in the decision policy), and complexity (i.e., the inclusion of 
significant interaction weights, indicating that trade-offs are made within different levels 
of a parameter). Based on the characteristics of expertise reported in the literature, we 
expected that more experienced coaches would be able to weigh more factors dif-
ferentially in their decisions, and hence would have more comprehensive and complex 
decision policies. This should be expressed in a higher number of significant regression 
weights and higher order interaction effects. 
With respect to the (quantified) verbal data, we expected that more experience 
would lead coaches to draw upon a larger number of arguments or considerations, and 
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that more experienced coaches would show more consideration for the wider context 
and consequences of the decision. Conversely, less experienced coaches were expected 
to show more sensitivity to the immediately available, surface, characteristics of the situ-
ation. 
method
participants
Sixty four coaches (49 females, 15 males) of competitive female gymnasts took part 
in the study. They represented approximately 90% of the coaches involved in female 
competitive gymnastics in the province of Alberta, Canada, at the time of the study. 
Ages ranged from 16-57 years (M = 28.6, SD = 8.1), and coaching experience from 1 
to 35 years (M = 9.5, SD = 7.1). For the purpose of the analysis presented in this paper, 
the coaches were divided into three groups according to years of experience. The least 
experienced group (n = 19) had 1-5 years (M = 2.8, SD = 1.3), the intermediate group 
(n = 23) 6-10 years (M = 7.8, SD = 1.4), and the most experienced group (n = 22) more 
than 10 years of coaching experience (M = 16.9, SD = 6.8). This division was mostly 
data-driven, in that the 33rd percentile fell between 5 and 6 and the 66th percentile 
between 10 and 11, leading to three groups of relatively equal sizes. In relation to the 
often-adopted “10 years of deliberate practice” criterion of expertise (Ericsson, Krampe, 
& Tesch-Romer, 1993), this division roughly classifies the coaches into those that are at 
the early-to-middle stages of expertise, those that are in the middle-to-expert stages, and 
those that are at the expert stage. 
Data collEction
Data were collected via a questionnaire, which was pilot tested for clarity on six for-
mer gymnastics coaches and was administered via telephone interviews. The study was 
introduced to the participating coaches via a letter explaining the purpose and back-
ground of the study and announcing that they would receive a call with the request for 
a telephone interview. All coaches consented to the interview being audio-taped. Inter-
views were transcribed verbatim. The mean duration of the interviews was 46 minutes 
(SD = 13.2). 
quEstionnairE
The questionnaire consisted of 16 hypothetical scenarios describing situations in which 
a gymnast sustained an injury prior to a competition, as well as a number of open and 
closed questions concerning socio-graphic characteristics (e.g., age, gender, years of 
coaching experience, education). The 16 scenarios were designed according to a full 
factorial design (Louvière, 1988) of four factors with two levels each: (a) competition 
importance (an invitational tournament versus an important qualifying competition), (b) 
athlete age (8 versus 15 years), (c) athlete ability (average versus best), and (d) in-
jury severity (a moderate second-degree ankle sprain incurred one week before the 
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competition versus a severe second-degree ankle sprain incurred three weeks before the 
competition). In all scenarios it was assumed that the athlete wanted to compete. The 
description of each parameter level stayed the same across all scenarios, except for the 
description of the injury, which was more extensive in the first two scenarios (see Figure 
1 for the text of these scenarios). The 16 unique combinations of the factor levels were 
randomly divided over the scenarios, which were then presented in the same order to 
each coach. For each scenario, the coaches were told to imagine that it was the night 
before the competition and were asked to rate the likelihood that they would let the ath-
lete participate in the competition on a 10-point scale (0 = highly unlikely, 10 = highly 
likely). In addition to their numerical responses, the coaches provided verbal comments 
about the reasons behind and considerations involved in their decisions. 
analysis
Numerical data. The numerical responses to the scenarios were analyzed using a Con-
joint Analysis procedure (Louvière, 1988) to calculate the coaches’ decision policies 
(i.e., the effect of each factor and combination of factors on the likelihood of competing). 
Based on Information Integration Theory (Anderson, 1981), this procedure employs a 
multi-linear polynomial mathematical function to model decision makers’ policies. In-
dividual decision policies were calculated for each coach via regression analysis with 
effect coding. The resulting regression weights were subsequently aggregated across 
coaches and examined in two ways. First, the comprehensiveness and complexity of 
the policies within each level of experience were examined by looking at significant 
Figure 1. Text of the first two scenarios.
Moderate Injury   8 Year Old    Athlete of Average Ability   Qualifying Competition  
Imagine that you have an 8 year old athlete who sprained her ankle exactly one week ago. She has recovered to the point where 
there is still some swelling and some minor limitation in the range of motion. She is guarding her foot a little bit and is limping 
after she performs one or two elements in which she needs her feet. This weekend, there is an important qualifying meet coming 
up, you can think of Zone Championships or Interprovincial Cup Trials. The athlete says that she is “fine” and she is eager to 
participate in the competition. This is an athlete of average ability, and although she is enthusiastic and loves gymnastics, you 
would not expect her to place in the top 8 or 10, even with her best performance. It is now the night before the competition, and 
you have to decide whether or not you will allow her to compete.
Severe Injury    8 Year Old    One of Your Best Athletes    Qualifying Competition 
In this scenario there is again an important qualifying competition coming up this weekend. Now imagine that you have an 8 year 
old who is one of your best gymnasts. She would almost certainly place in the top 8 of her category if she could compete well. 
However, 3 weeks ago she severely sprained her ankle. She was on crutches for about a week. She has kept her fitness level up by 
swimming and riding a bike and stretching, but she has done practically no weight bearing activities. This week she has started to 
do some training, mostly on beam and uneven bars. She has recovered to the point where there is still some swelling and a limited 
range of motion. She is limping when she walks into the gym. Yet, she is eager to compete again and says that the pain does not 
bother her. It is now the night before the competition, and you have to decide whether or not you will allow her to compete. 
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main and interaction effects per group. This was done using the multivariate General 
Linear Model procedure in SPSS, followed by Holm-Bonferroni corrections for multiple 
comparisons (Atkinson, 2002). Second, the relationship between coaching experience 
and decision weights was examined by correlating years of coaching experience with 
the regression weights for main and interaction effects. 
Verbal data. The verbal responses to the scenarios were analyzed using common 
qualitative data analysis procedures in which categories are sought that describe the 
various components of a phenomenon expressed in the text (Smith, 1995). This analysis 
was followed by an attempt to categorize and quantify (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998; 
Vergeer & Lyle, 2007) the comments of the coaches in order to facilitate comparison of 
differences and similarities between the three groups. The qualitative analysis resulted 
in a list of 20 categories of issues mentioned by the coaches in justifying their decisions. 
These 20 categories were further subdivided into subcategories representing the various 
components and manifestations of each category. For example, the category “modifica-
tions to competing” had as subcategories: (a) compete in only one or two events, (b) wa-
ter down the level of difficulty of the routine, (c) tape, support the foot well, (d) see how 
it goes, pull her out if necessary. The category “athlete ability” had as subcategories, 
among others: (a) it does not matter whether she is average or best, (b) competing is less 
likely because the athlete is of average ability and not expected to do well or place, (c) 
competing is more likely because the athlete is one of the best, it is important that she 
competes. Overall, this subdivision resulted in an index of 95 subcategories (referred to 
as “statements”), which was subsequently used to code the comments that the coaches 
made in responding to the scenarios. This coding was done independently by three 
coders. Any discrepancies were solved by using the majority vote or disregarding the 
statement. This procedure resulted in frequency counts representing the total number of 
times each statement was mentioned by each coach during the interview. 
Comparison between the three groups took place with regard to (a) the total number 
of statements made per coach (averaged per group), using ANOVA, and (b) the frequen-
cies with which each statement was mentioned. Because the large number of different 
statements and subsequent low power precluded the use of statistical tests for the latter, 
the following procedure was used to arrive at an impression of possible differences in 
statements made by each of the three groups. First, in order to compensate for the un-
equal number of coaches per group, average frequencies (AF) of statements rather than 
absolute frequencies were used for comparison. These were calculated by dividing the 
total number of times a statement was made within a group by the number of coaches in 
that group. Furthermore, in order to select statements with a reasonable frequency of oc-
currence, only those statements with an AF above the expected frequency (calculated by 
dividing the average number of statements per coach in each group by the total possible 
number of statements) for its group were considered for comparison. The comparison of 
the resulting statements between groups was then based on the relative differences [i.e., 
(group1 – group2)/(group1 + group2)] in AF per statement, calculated for each set of two 
groups. The statements reported (Figure 3) as distinguishing most between the groups 
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were those with a relative difference of .33 or more. A more detailed description of this 
procedure and its rationale can be found in Vergeer and Lyle (2007).
results
coachEs’ pErsonal BackgrounD 
Demographics. Not surprisingly, years of coaching experience was strongly correlated 
with age (r = .83, p = .000). Mean age was 21.7 years (SD = 3.3) for the least ex-
perienced group, 28.4 years (SD = 6.1) for the intermediate, and 34.6 years (SD = 
8.2) for the most experienced group. The majority of the coaches in this study were fe-
male (76.7%), although the male-female ratio differed significantly between the groups, 
χ2 (2, N = 64) = 11.8, p = .003. The percentage of female coaches was 100% in the 
least experienced group, 78.3% in the intermediate, and 44.5% in the most experienced 
group. Coaching experience was also associated with level of competitive involvement, 
with more of the more experienced coaches coaching at the higher levels, χ2 (4, N = 64) 
= 16.2, p = .003. See Table 1 for percentages.
Coach education. Almost all coaches (96.6%) were certified through the Canadian 
National Coaching Certification Program (NCCP). Their credentials varied from the low-
est level (I), basic coaching skills, to the second highest level (IV), leadership skills for 
working with national and international athletes. The majority of the least (68.4%) and 
intermediate (73.9%) experienced coaches were certified at level II. Of the most expe-
rienced coaches, 36.4% were certified at level II, 45.4% at level III, and 9.1% at level 
IV. The groups also showed some differences in levels of general education as more 
coaches in the most experienced group had completed university degrees (63.3%) than 
in the intermediate (43.5%) and least experienced (26.3%) groups. 
Education in injury care and management. In terms of learning how to care for and 
manage sports injuries, the coaches reported both formal and informal educational 
experiences. The majority of coaches (75%) had taken a first aid course. Overall, the 
Table 1. Highest competitive level coached within each group of coaching 
experience, divided into highest level coached at the time of the study (“now”) and 
highest level ever coached (“ever”). 
Coaching Experience
Level
1-5 years
now             ever
6-10 years
now             ever
> 10 years
now             ever
Basic 
(Local & Provincial) 66.7            52.6 36.4             17.4 31.6            13.6
Intermediate 
(Canada-West) 33.3            42.1 36.4            43.5 31.6            27.3
Elite
(National/International) 0.0              5.3 27.3            39.1 36.8            59.1
 Note.  The numbers represent percentages within each level of coaching experience.
I. Vergeer and J. Lyle
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number of coaches who had received any formal sports-specific injury education was 
rather low (40.6%), but it was evident that growing experience was associated with 
increased exposure to such instruction; 63.6% of the more experienced coaches had 
attended at least one, if not many, injury courses or workshops, while this figure was 
39.1% and 15.8% for the intermediate and least experienced coaches, respectively. In 
a similar pattern to the more formally acquired knowledge, a greater proportion of the 
more experienced (40.9%) coaches, compared to the intermediate (26.1%) and least 
experienced (21.1%) ones, also reported making use of informally acquired knowledge 
about injury management. This included, for example, personally having had many 
injuries, talking with medical professionals at any opportunity, extensive reading about 
injuries, learning about anatomy and physiology through vocational training (e.g., den-
tal assistant, physiotherapist, fitness instructor), and “being around people who know a 
lot about injuries and how to deal with them.” 
numErical DEcision policiEs
Following Louvière’s (1988) procedure, individual “decision policies” were determined 
for each coach by calculating regression weights for the intercept (the overall likeli-
hood of competing), each of the main effects, and all of the interaction effects. These 
individual policies were subsequently aggregated per group to examine any significant 
weighing of main and interaction effects per level of experience. Multivariate ANOVAs, 
followed by Holm-Bonferroni corrections for multiple comparisons (Atkinson, 2002), re-
sulted in four significant weights for the least experienced group (intercept, p = .000; 
injury1, p = .016; ability, p = .016; and ability-competition interaction, p = .016), five 
significant weights for the intermediate group (intercept, p = .000; injury, p = .000; age, 
p = .000; ability, p = .000; and competition, p = .000), and six significant weights for 
the most experienced group (intercept, p = .000; injury, p = .032; age, p = .000; ability, 
p = .032; competition, p = .048; and ability-competition interaction, p = .016) (see also 
Table 2 and Figure 2). These results indicate that the more experienced coaches tended 
to weigh more factors in their decision-making policies, but that their decisions were not 
necessarily more complex as expressed in higher order interactions. 
Pearson’s correlations between coaching experience and the various decision 
weights showed a significant inverse relationship of experience with the intercept 
(r = -.36, p = .003), indicating a tendency for the more experienced coaches to assign 
lower likelihood scores to the scenarios. Conversely, none of the correlations with main ef-
fect or interaction weights were significant, suggesting that the weighing of the various fac-
tor levels did not become stronger or more complex with increasing years of experience.
quantifiED vErBalizations
Total number of statements. Coaching experience was not significantly correlated with 
the number of statements made in response to the scenarios (r = .04, p = .763). Although 
the most experienced group made the highest total number of statements (on average 
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29.9 per coach, SD = 15.4), the smallest number (23.8, SD 9.3) was made by the inter-
mediate group, with the least experienced group making 25.5 statements on average 
(SD = 16.3). These averages were not significantly different from each other (F(2, 61) 
= 1.133, p = .329), which refutes the assumption that more experience would lead 
coaches to draw upon a larger number of arguments or considerations. 
Comparisons of statement content. Following the procedures outlined earlier, the 
content of the statements made by the coaches was compared between each pair of 
groups. Figure 3 shows the statements that distinguished the least experienced group 
from the intermediate group, and the intermediate group from the most experienced 
group. The statements differentiating between the most and least experienced groups 
are not shown, as these statements were mostly similar to the ones distinguishing the most 
experienced from the intermediate group—albeit with slightly different numbers and 
with some additional disparities. In particular, in comparison with the least experienced 
group, the most experienced group more often mentioned obtaining medical advice 
through direct communication with a medical professional (R.D. = .33), talking with 
the athlete to explain why she would not compete (R.D. = .48), considering the risk of 
doing permanent damage (R.D. = .35), and taking account of the athlete’s keenness or 
Table 2. Conjoint decision weights per group.
1-5 years 6-10 years > 10 years
Intercept 3.76 *** 3.57 *** 2.79 ***
Injury 0.56 * 1.14 *** 0.65 * 
Age 0.34 0.62 *** 0.63 ***
Ability 0.56 * 0.38 *** 0.35 *
Competition 0.47 0.51 *** 0.55 *
Injury-Age 0.08 0.13 0.18
Injury-Ability 0.08 0.18 0.10
Injury-Competition 0.23 * 0.06 0.12
Age-Ability 0.06 0.04 0.07
Age-Competition 0.05 0.11 0.21
Ability-Competition 0.46 0.26 0.26*
Injury-Age-Ability 0.04 0.20 0.02
Injury-Age-Competition 0.00 0.02 0.17
Injury-Ability-Competition 0.18 0.13 0.20
Age-Ability-Competition 0.04 0.06 0.04
Injury-Age-Ability-Competition 0.10 0.16 0.20
Weights significant at:  *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05
I. Vergeer and J. Lyle
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Figure 2. Averages for significant weights for each level of experience. Weights for 
main effects are abbreviated as follows: Mod = moderate injury, Sev = severe injury, 
Age 8 = 8-year-old athlete, Age 15 = 15-year-old athlete, Average = athlete of average 
ability, Best = one of the best athletes, Qual = important qualifying competition, Tour = 
invitational tournament. Weights for interaction effects are abbreviated as follows: AQ = 
average athlete – qualifying competition, AT = average athlete – tournament, BQ = best 
athlete – qualifying competition, BT = best athlete – tournament
Coaching Experience and Decision Making
441
Statements made more often by coaches with 1-5 years experience than by coaches with 6+ years experience
A.D. R.D.
.52 .41 tape; support the foot well; do a good warm-up
.45 .56 obtaining medical advice, but not obviously through direct personal contact
  with the doctor or physio involved (e.g., “What did the doctor say?”)
.21 .41 it is up to the athlete and/or her parents
.30 .45 less likely if it hurts; if there is still pain
.26 .54 less likely, at 8 years of age kids are psychologically not ready to handle an injury, to 
  provide reliable information, to compete under stress
.54 .43 more likely, because at 15 she is getting near the end of her competitive career; she won’t 
  have many opportunities for competing left
.28 .61 less likely, because it may be a negative experience (in terms of a sense of personal 
  failure; might undermine her confidence, motivation)
Statements made more often by coaches with 6-10 years experience than by coaches with 1-5 years experience
A.D. R.D.
.21 .66 it is the coach’s decision, but there is the possibility that the parents will veto or reverse the decision
.21 .66 It does not matter whether she is average or best
.70 1.00 depending on characteristics of the competition (type, timing, importance, etc)
.33 .61 less likely, because it is unlikely that she will be able to do her moves/routines/skills well
  enough to make it worthwhile; to get through her routines
.25 .71 depending on the athlete’s motivation, keenness, eagerness, ambition
.27 .39 depending on the athlete’s pain tolerance; mental toughness
.33 .61 the athlete’s competitive level makes a difference
Statements made more often by coaches with >10 years experience than by coaches with 6-10 years experience
A.D. R.D.
.50 .74 find an alternative to competing, e.g., get a medical bye; take her to the meet to watch
.71 .40 obtain medical advice, directly or indirectly
.52 .40 the athlete has input in the decision; coach and athlete make the decision together; a shared decision
.19 .42 make decision earlier than the night before
.23 .47 talk with athlete to assure she has realistic expectations about competing (e.g., “we are 
  not going in this to win”)
.33 .39 there has not been enough time to recover; it has only been a week / 3 weeks
.23 .57 less likely, we don’t compete kids that young
.19 .35 age-related physical reasons (e.g., risk of growth plate injuries; healing faster when  
  younger; being heavier when older)
.28 .45 more likely, because she is one of the best, it is important that she competes; this meet is 
  important for her; she might do well in this meet
.46 .73 depending on when this qualifying meet is, how important it is, whether it can be petitioned
.59 .77 take into account what the doctor says
.45 1.00 if the doctor said okay, then competing would depend on other factors (e.g., if her routines 
  can be watered down)
Figure 3. Statements differentiating most between the least and intermediate 
experienced groups, and between the intermediate and most experienced 
groups. The first column (A.D.) denotes the absolute difference in average 
frequency (AF) scores between the groups, the second column (R.D.) the relative 
difference. The statements are ordered by topic.
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ambition (R.D. = .77) and competitive level (R.D. = .68). Furthermore, arguments related 
to characteristics of the competition, such as type of competition, timing, or importance, 
were never mentioned by the least experienced group (R.D. = 1.00).
Closer inspection of the differences in statements made by the three groups suggests 
that the least experienced coaches focused their strategies and arguments more often 
on directly available or obtainable information, such as the amount of pain the athlete 
was experiencing, or medical advice. They also tended to emphasize psychological 
arguments, for example, about the experience the athlete might have if she did compete, 
or how the athlete’s psychological characteristics would impact the trustworthiness of 
the information. In terms of strategies, they were more likely to mention physical support 
strategies to be used when competing injured, and to relinquish responsibility for the 
decision by leaving it up to the athlete and/or her parents. In comparison, coaches in 
the intermediate group showed more sensitivity to the factors that may affect an athlete’s 
capacity to compete successfully with an injury, such as ambition, pain tolerance, com-
petitive level, and the injury’s impact on the ability to execute full routines. The type, tim-
ing, and relative importance of the competition also factored into their considerations, in 
contrast to the least experienced group, where such considerations were not found at all. 
Further inspection suggests that the considerations of the most experienced group 
displayed more emphasis on the managerial aspects of the decision. This is evident in 
strategies like finding alternatives to competing, sharing the decision with the athlete 
and/or parents, taking care of the consequences of the decision by talking with the ath-
lete to assure understanding and/or realistic expectations, making sure medical advice is 
acquired, and taking doctor’s recommendations into account—whether following them 
as given or considering them as one of the factors affecting the decision. These most 
experienced coaches also were more likely to invoke rules around the decision-making 
process, such as making the decision earlier than the night before the competition, or not 
letting 8-year-olds compete in general. Furthermore, they were more likely to interpret 
the recovery time for the injury as insufficient. Attention to the characteristics of the com-
petition was also strong for this group, especially to the characteristics of a qualifying 
competition. 
discussion
In this paper, we attempted to expand the empirical literature on the role of experience 
in coaches’ decision making by examining this role, operationalized as number of years 
in coaching, in previously collected mixed-method data (Vergeer, 1994) on coaches’ 
decisions about the participation of an injured athlete in competition. On the basis 
of the literature on cognitive differences between experts and novices (e.g., Araújo et 
al., 2005; Galanter & Patel, 2005; Jones et al., 1995), we expected that the greater 
cognitive complexity and deeper knowledge structures associated with expertise would 
enable the more experienced coaches to consider and integrate a larger number of fac-
tors in their decisions. This would be evidenced in more comprehensive and complex nu-
merical decision policies, a higher number of statements, and attention to deeper rather 
than surface characteristics of the situation. In comparison, coaches with less experience 
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were expected to use less comprehensive and complex decision policies, make less 
statements, and pay more attention to surface characteristics. The findings supported 
these expectations to a reasonable extent, and also revealed some additional insights. 
The least experienced coaches did indeed show the least comprehensive decision 
policies, not significantly weighing the age and competition parameters. The lack of at-
tention paid to the characteristics of the competition was also borne out by the verbal 
data, which showed a clear absence of any competition-related considerations within 
this group. At the same time, with increasing experience the numerical decision policies 
showed an increase in the number of significant decision weights, suggesting that more 
experienced coaches took account of a larger number of factors in their decisions. The 
strength of the decision weights and the complexity of the decision policies (i.e., the 
number of significant interaction effects, indicating a differential influence of different 
combinations of parameter levels), however, were not linearly related to experience. The 
strongest (i.e., most significantly different from zero) main effect decision weights were 
found in the intermediate group, and both the most and the least experienced group 
recorded a significant weight for the ability-competition interaction. 
These findings imply that the increasing cognitive complexity may not express itself 
in a straightforward numerical manner in the weighing of the decision parameters, an 
issue earlier alluded to by Shanteau and Stewart (1992). Closer inspection of the signifi-
cant ability-competition interaction in the most and least experienced groups suggests 
that this interaction in fact represented qualitatively different uses of the informational 
parameters in these two groups. Where the least experienced group only differentiated 
best athlete/important competition from the other combinations and did not mention con-
siderations involving the role of competition characteristics, the most experienced group 
showed more differentiations between the parameter levels, and mentioned a variety of 
considerations related to both athlete and competition characteristics. This suggests that 
the interaction effect in the least experienced group was probably more due to surface 
interpretations of the information (athlete is important, competition is important), while in 
the most experienced group the interpretations were regulated via a range of additional 
considerations.
The verbal data also indicated that the least experienced group showed more sen-
sitivity to the surface characteristics of the problem, paying attention to the most obvious 
or most immediate information, such as pain and medical opinion. Athletes’ emotional 
reactions, which coaches would have to deal with in face-to-face interactions with the 
athlete, may also be classified as surface characteristics, and may explain this group’s 
greater preoccupation with psychological arguments and the stronger tendency to relin-
quish responsibility for the decision. Most of the considerations in this group were also 
short-term, concerned with the immediate situation.
The intermediate group showed the strongest main effect weights in their decision 
policies, indicating the importance of each of the parameters’ dimensions in the de-
cision choice. The verbal data of the intermediate group, in comparison to the least 
experienced group, indicated a move away from concerns with surface characteristics 
of the situation to a more in-depth and structured problem representation that takes into 
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account the importance and type of the competition, and a range of factors likely to im-
pact the injured athlete’s ability to produce a performance that is still worthwhile within 
the athlete’s goals. This shift in emphasis is in line with the commonly identified ability 
of experts to focus in on the most pertinent problem information (Araújo et al., 2005; 
Jones et al., 1995). With 6 to 10 years of experience within the coaching domain, these 
coaches seemed to be particularly focused on taking into account the range of factors 
that impact on an athlete’s performance, weighing the pros and cons and deliberating 
about the decision within a problem frame structured around performance parameters. 
 Coaches in the most experienced group, compared to those in the least and 
intermediate groups, did indeed show consideration of a larger range of factors in their 
argumentation. These factors related to a variety of characteristics of both the athlete 
and the situation, and of short- as well as long-term consequences. In accordance with 
Abraham et al.’s (2006) findings, the coaches in this group more often mentioned con-
cern with the consequences of the decision, and invoked more rules in their decision 
making. This illustrates at the same time a widening of cognitive capacity to include more 
issues in one’s considerations, and a narrowing of options by invoking certain decision 
rules or managing strategies to facilitate the decision process. This simultaneous widen-
ing and narrowing may explain why we did not find an association between coaching 
experience and the number of statements made. Although more issues were taken into 
consideration, the application of decision rules may have served to reduce uncertainty, 
thereby decreasing the need for more extensive deliberation in the form of describing 
information-gathering procedures, weighing pros and cons, or engaging in assumption-
based reasoning (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997). 
As Lipshitz and Strauss (1997) noted, decision makers often face uncertainty, in the 
form of inadequate understanding of the problem, lack of information, or the inability to 
differentiate between equally (un-)attractive alternatives. A common tactic in response 
to uncertainty is to delay the decision. The fact that the most experienced coaches 
were more likely to do the opposite—by invoking the decision rule of making the deci-
sion earlier (than the night before the competition)—is an indication that these coaches 
have learned to reduce uncertainty at an earlier stage of the decision process, by what 
Lipshitz and Strauss (1997) called “controlling the sources of variability which reduce 
predictability” (p. 153). This may be linked to the fact that they pay greater attention 
to the consequences of the decision, and are consistent with the ability to take a more 
managerial approach, where the concern is less with the immediate presenting charac-
teristics and short-term consequences of the situation and more with the underlying issues 
and longer-term consequences. 
The tactic of reducing uncertainty by relinquishing the responsibility for the decision 
found in the least experienced group may reflect a differentiation in the degree of gen-
eral confidence and control that coaches may experience as a function of the duration 
of their involvement in coaching. Jones et al. (1995) reported, for example, that inexperi-
enced coaches showed higher anxiety levels in comparison to experienced coaches, and 
Weiss, Barber, Sisley, and Ebbeck (1991) reported a number of perceived inadequacies 
in coaching competence that undermined the confidence of novice female coaches. 
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In this study we operationalized experience as the number of years spent in coach-
ing. Although several authors have argued that accumulating experience is not neces-
sarily the same as developing expertise (e.g., Abraham et al., 2006; Eells, Lombart, 
Kendjelic, Turner, & Lucas, 2005), it could be contended that prolonged involvement in 
a given domain provides the prerequisite circumstances for developing expertise, by sup-
plying more opportunities to (a) attend courses and workshops and gain declarative and 
procedural knowledge, (b) learn from exposure to and interaction with other coaches, 
and (c) encounter problems and, hence, learn from searching solutions and reflecting 
on chosen actions, and by doing so deepen existing knowledge structures (Werthner & 
Trudel, 2006). The higher number of formal and informal injury-education experiences 
reported by the more experienced coaches support the first two of these assumptions. 
On a related note, the finding that increased experience was associated with more 
education in injury care and management on the one hand, with a decrease in likeli-
hood ratings on the other, tentatively suggests that injury education plays a role in sensi-
tizing coaches to the risks of competing injured. This is further supported by the finding 
that coaches in the most experienced group were more likely to interpret recovery time 
as insufficient and to mention the risk of doing permanent damage. The extent and qual-
ity of this relationship are far from clear, however, and are likely to be complex, in par-
ticular the role of formal versus informal educational experiences. Earlier results showed, 
for example, that coaches with more cautious decision policies were more likely to have 
had bad personal or vicarious experiences with competing injured in the past (Vergeer 
& Hogg, 1999)—emphasizing the role of personal history in coaching practice (Cushion 
et al., 2003). There are ample indicators in the recent literature that the development of 
coaching knowledge and expertise is highly unstructured and serendipitous in nature 
(Abraham et al., 2006; Cushion et al., 2003). Even in more formally institutionalized 
professional training practices, like medicine and psychotherapy, it is recognized that 
the progression from novice to expert is not necessarily characterized by a gradual and 
steady accumulation of skills and knowledge, but rather as “an arduous process of con-
tinually learning, re-learning and exercising new knowledge” (Galanter & Patel, 2005, 
p. 682), a process further influenced by the specific learning environment and oppor-
tunities offered to the developing professional in various internships (Eells et al., 2005). 
Untangling the specific contributions of formal versus informal educational experiences 
may prove challenging; however, the results of this study suggest that the accumulation 
of these experiences over time is associated with a more cautious approach to decision 
making about injured athletes.
Overall, we did find indicators of increasing cognitive complexity and a move from 
attention to surface characteristics toward attention to performance-related consider-
ations—reflecting at the same time an increased ability to focus on the most relevant 
performance-injury related information and a stronger absorption of the values of the 
sub-culture (Cushion et al., 2003). Beyond this, we found a further move toward conse-
quence-considered argumentation in a wider context. Experienced coaches appeared 
to “frame the problem” within a broader context and were able to bring to bear a num-
ber of already-stored solutions. This efficiency in narrowing hypotheses and selecting 
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options in decision making may be a confounding factor in representing complexity and 
depth of knowledge in research into expertise.
Can any implications for coaching practice be derived from this study? Generally 
speaking, coach development is geared toward providing coaches with experiences 
that will help them build relevant and complex cognitive structures that should enhance 
their decision making. Are there possibilities to expedite this process? One strategy 
that may be applied in formal coach education is exposure to complex (hypothetical 
or real) scenarios that include not only varied injury characteristics, but also different 
athlete characteristics (e.g., body composition, personality, career stage, competitive 
goals), and various competition characteristics. Examining and debating such complex 
scenarios may help less experienced coaches to develop sensitivity to the complexities of 
the situation, enabling them to rely less on surface information and possibly apply more 
advanced decision strategies. In a more informal way, working alongside experienced 
coaches and operating within an environment with clearly defined decision rules may 
accelerate the use of more advanced strategies. This was evidenced, despite the group 
differences, by a few of the lesser experienced coaches who did in fact demonstrate use 
of decision rules that were more commonly found among the more experienced group, 
such as making the decision earlier in the week or not competing younger gymnasts. 
These coaches tended to be working in more structured club environments and along-
side more experienced coaches. Coaching practice, therefore, may benefit from inter-
ventions targeting both formal and informal education; the first through the dissemination 
of complex injury decision scenarios, the latter through the establishment of social and 
environmental structures that allow less experienced coaches exposure to more experi-
enced coaches and more advanced decision environments. 
As several authors (Abraham et al., 2006; Jones et al., 1997; Lyle, 2002) have 
argued, coaching expertise is multi-dimensional and complex, and the use of both quan-
titative and qualitative methods has been recommended to shed light on the nature of 
coaching expertise (Jones et al., 1997). By employing a mixed methods design, we com-
bined quantitative and qualitative methods to elucidate coaches’ decision making about 
a specific problem. The use of scenarios, vignettes, or attribute/case descriptions is very 
common in the judgment and decision-making literature (e.g., Brehmer & Brehmer, 1988; 
Eells et al., 2005; Patel et al., 2002), and offers an opportunity for systematic variation 
of parameter levels, although it has its limitations by reducing complex real-life decision 
situations to hypothetical scenarios and numerical likelihood ratings. The fact that we 
conducted a secondary analysis on data already collected for a different purpose also 
resulted in a somewhat forced translation of cognitive complexity into the numerical 
data. However, the collection of the qualitative data within the quantitative structures 
allowed for more systematic examination of arguments in relation to coaches’ levels of 
experience and other attributes, and perhaps led to the most insightful information in 
this study. 
Much of the literature on expertise and expert-novice differences is cognitive in 
nature, emphasizing the development from superficial and limited cognitive structures 
to highly complex and integrated cognitive structures. Even so, when investigating the 
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role of experience and the development of expertise in specific professional domains 
such as coaching, there is likely to be merit in expanding the view beyond the cognitive 
perspective to include other psychological components as well, for example, coaches’ 
perceptions of competence, ambivalence, anxiety, and confidence in relation to their 
role. Such concepts have been incorporated in various stage models of professional ex-
pertise development in psychotherapy (Watkins, 1995), describing trajectories of initial 
insecurities, dependence, and ambivalence via experimentation and differentiation to 
increased independence, integration, awareness, confidence, and professional identity. 
Such research would help situate the cognitive development of expertise in a broader 
psychological context. Further expansions to include social, environmental, and career 
development (e.g., promotion to head coach) contexts would also enrich our knowledge 
of the development of coaching expertise. The greater emphasis on managerial aspects 
found among the most experienced group may, for example, reflect the assumption of a 
strategic coordination role for more senior coaches.
This study has provided some empirical information about the relationship between 
coaching experience and decision making with respect to a specific coaching problem: 
the participation of an injured athlete in competition. Given that we conducted a sec-
ondary analysis on data originally collected from a different perspective, there were a 
number of limitations to this study. Nevertheless, we do believe, considering the dearth 
of empirical research on the novice-expert paradigm in coaching, that this paper adds 
to our understanding of the role of experience in coaches’ decision making. In particular, 
the qualitative data collected within the quantitative framework provided insights into the 
way in which the increasing cognitive complexity associated with growing experience is 
expressed in the decision making about a particular coaching problem. 
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endnotes
1 For brevity sake we refer to the various parameters as “injury” (injury severity), “age” 
(athlete age), “ability” (athlete ability), and “competition” (competition importance). 
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